Tuesday, November 15, 2005

Cooking the war

I have deliberately stayed apart from the arguments about whether President Bush cooked intelligence in order to justify the invasion of Iraq. The reason is that I pledged myself after the last election that I would not do partisan politics on this site. I have not kept this promise completely, but I've come pretty close.

But enough is enough. My son is fighting in Iraq. He called via satellite phone yesterday and related taking part this week in a very large infantry, armor and air power raid against terrorists in the Fallujah vicinity. Prominent Democrats are accusing President Bush of lying to them and the American people, of cooking the intelligence about Iraq and claiming that their votes to authorize war were mistakes. They have crossed a line that I cannot in conscience ignore.

The question of the accuracy of the intelligence regarding Saddam and WMDs is certainly legitimate. Questions about the conduct of war are legitimate - I have not been kind at times to the administration about that, especially about Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's deliberate discarding of studies by the Army Staff before the war that the prospective invasion force was to small by about half to secure the country effectively when organized resistance ceased.

I don't have a problem with inquiring whether the intelligence was "bent" by the administration. But it's been done. The Senate Intelligence Committee addressed at this issue in its "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq."

The Committee found no evidence that the IC's [Intelligence Community's] mischaracterization or exaggeration of the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities was the result of political pressure.

The Committee detailed the many failures of the intelligence community, but there was no misuse of the intelligence assessments by the administration.

In fact, the president acted in the only responsible manner possible in light of the assessments he was given. These assessments included the unanimous conclusions by the intelligence services of England, France and Germany that Iraq was well on the way to becoming a nuclear power. The German assessment was actually bleaker than any of the other three powers.

Let's go back to Jan. 27, 2003, when Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix delivered his report to the UN as required and said the following:

Resolution 687 in 1991, like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq, but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. ...

... Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace. ...

As we know, the twin operation declare and verify, which was prescribed in Resolution 687, too often turned into a game of hide and seek. ...

While Iraq claims, with little evidence, that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA. ...

For nearly three years [since Dec. 1999] , Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. ...

Resolution 1441 was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. ...

[Blix then spent a few paragraphs reporting that ther inspection regime cionsisted of two parts, process and access. Access, he said, was satisfactory with only a few problems. But he recounted a number of times the inspectors were harrassed. Then:]

Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441 states that this cooperation shall be "active." It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of catch as catch can. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items. ...

On 7th of December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of Resolution 1441 ...

These reports [that is, two reports by Blix's commission] do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to a lack of evidence and inconsistencies which raise question marks which must be straightened out if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq, rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM.

Regrettably, the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that will eliminate the questions or reduce their number. ...

The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tons, and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. ...

UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. ...

There are also indications that the agent was weaponized. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. ...

The [Iraqi air force] document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi air force between 1983 and 1998, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tons. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at the storage depot, 170 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved here in the past few years at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding.

Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve, but rather points to the issue of several thousand of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for. ...

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of ... a mustard [gas] precursor. ...

I turn to biological weapons. I mention the issue of anthrax to the council on previous occasions, and I come back to it as it is an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared and that at least some of this was retained over the declared destruction date. It might still exist. ...

As I reported to the council on the 19th of December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilos, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as reported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As a part of its 7 December 2002 declaration Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate, as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.

In the letter of 24th of January this year to the president of the Security Council, Iraq's foreign minister stated that, I quote, "All imported quantities of growth media were declared." This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax. ...

Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the contrary, they should have the benefit of the doubt; be presumed innocent.

UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq. But nor is it, or I think anyone else, after the inspections between 1991 and '98 presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem; evidence and full transparency may help. ...

This report could not possibly build confidence that Iraq was at heart a peaceful nation with no intentions of retaining or reconstituting mass-destructive weapons programs. Quite the opposite, the report reasonably led to concluding that Iraq was determined to do exactly the opposite. Furthermore, the president knew that there were real and substantive connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, even though Iraq was not linked to the 9/11 attacks. For example, Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam Lt. Col. Ahmed Hikmat Shakir:

Six days after September 11, Shakir was captured in Doha, Qatar. He had in his possession contact information for several senior al Qaeda terrorists: Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, the Iraqi who helped mix the chemicals for the first World Trade Center attack and was given safe haven upon his return to Baghdad; and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, otherwise known as Abu Hajer al Iraqi, described by one top al Qaeda detainee as Osama bin Laden's "best friend."

Much, much more at the link. Then there's this summary by Richard Miniter. Were there constant, enduring ties between Saddam and Osama bin Laden? No. But both men hated the United States. Saddam had billions of dollars at his disposal while bin Laden has merely a few tens of millions, not enough to run an ambitious, worldwide terror program. (One al Qaeda perp captured after the bombings of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1988 complained bitterly that bin Laden wouldn't pay for a doctor's visit for the perp's pregnant wife.) As Stephen Hayes summarized, "I would certainly never argue that they were buddies. It was an on-again, off-again relationship based, as [Sen. Evan] Bayh says, on mutual exploitation and a common enemy."

One of the most powerful senators of the opposition party took to the floor of the US Senate in October 2002 and said:

I am forced to conclude, on all the evidence, that Saddam poses a significant risk.

Some argue it would be totally irrational for Saddam Hussein to initiate an attack against the mainland United States, and they believe he would not do it. But if Saddam thought he could attack America through terrorist proxies and cover the trail back to Baghdad, he might not think it so irrational.

...At the end of the day, we cannot let the security of American citizens rest in the hands of someone whose track record gives us every reason to fear that he is prepared to use the weapons he has against his enemies.

That would be Sen. Jay Rockefeller, Democrat and member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who voted for the resolution authorizing war against Iraq. So can we claim, "Rockefeller lied, people died?" Then in the last week Sen. Rockefeller told interviewer Chris Wallace that he was not responsible for that vote.

I'll go even farther than merely recount the history that Democrats are deliberately distorting. Let's pretend that then-CIA director George Tenet never told the president that Saddam's possession of WMDs was "a slam dunk." Imagine that instead the country's intelligence chief had told President Bush:

(1) There was some uncertainty about what the data indicated,

(2) There was disagreement among intelligence professionals on the status of Saddam's weapons programs,

(3) The consensus of the American IC was that it was much more likely than not that Saddam possessed some quantity of chemical weapons and had active programs to preserve or reconstitute his biological-weapons program and atomic-weapon program. This report was buttressed by officials such as Ambassador Joe Wilson, sent by the CIA to Nigeria, where he found that although Iraq had not actually obtained uranium ore from the country it had made the attempt. (Oh, you didn't know that such is exactly what Wilson reported?)

Blix's report, btw, would stay the same.

Even had there been uncertainty about Iraq's weapons programs, there was ample just cause to invade Iraq and topple Saddam. In fact, Sen. Hillary Clinton said to the Senate on Oct. 10, 2002 that

But if we get a clear requirement for unfettered inspections [from the UN], I believe the authority to use force to enforce that mandate is inherent in the original 1991 UN resolution, as President Clinton recognized when he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

At the request of the United Methodist News Service, I wrote an article for its release in Feb. 2003 that UMNS entitled, "Just cause exists for action against Iraq."

Saddam's regime threatens American lives and the peace of the entire Middle East. The Bush administration and the U.N. inspectors have provided conclusive proof of Iraq's programs to develop mass-destructive weapons and its extensive efforts to conceal them - efforts that continue to this day. There is solid evidence of Iraq's links to transnational terrorists. Saddam's regime is brutally repressive of its own people.

Whether the status quo with Iraq constitutes a cause for war should be debated. That the status quo should continue cannot be faithfully maintained. The question is not whether Saddam's regime must be ended and the Iraqi people freed; the question is only how. We pray that open war may yet be avoided. But to fail to act effectively to accomplish the just end is to make oneself an accomplice of injustice and ally oneself with murderous oppression. ...

A key fact is being overlooked in today's debate. The choice is not really between peace and war. We have not been at peace with Iraq since 1991, and Saddam wages war upon his own people every day. The issue is not beginning a war, but how long the present war will continue. Absent Iraqi compliance, the choice is between brief, controlled warfare imminently or the continued suffering of the Iraqi people, the continued absence of peace and almost certainly a truly terrible war later.

President Kennedy's words during the Cuban missile crisis still apply: "We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security... The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. ... Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, but now further action is required. ... The greatest danger of all would be to do nothing."

I also explained Saddam's murderous regime against his own people (like this). I stand by every word, including what I wrote about WMDs. Why? Because it's worth remembering that the only reason we have certainty now about Saddam's WMD programs is because we invaded Iraq. As Tod Lindberg points out,

We took down the Saddam government, arrested and detained as many senior Iraqi officials and weapons scientists as we could find, questioned them thoroughly, scoured the country for biological and chemical weapons supplies, and found evidence of programs variously abandoned or discontinued or on hold.

We found, however, no clear record of when or how (or whether) Saddam had destroyed whatever stockpiles he may once have possessed. Nor did we find any evidence that Saddam had done anything more than suppress his chemical, biological or nuclear ambitions for prudential reasons. On the contrary, there was ample reason to conclude that he hoped to reconstitute such programs at the first opportunity.

Then we come to the Duelfer Report, named after the chief of the US Iraq Survey Group, led by Charles Duelfer. No actual WMDs in Iraq, said the report, and that's where people usually stop. But the report also stated that:

Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq's banned weapons programs, including nuclear weapons.

Saddam was determined to develop ballistic missiles and tactical chemical weapons when the U.N. sanctions were either lifted or corroded.

Saddam retained the industrial equipment to help restart these programs, having increased from 1996 to 2002 his military industrial spending 40-fold and his technical military research 80-fold. Even while U.N. weapons inspectors were in Iraq, Saddam's scientists were performing deadly experiments on human guinea pigs in secret labs.

To what end? The overlooked section of the Duelfer report could not have put it any clearer: "Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agents in a period of months and nerve agent in less than a year or two." While Saddam had abandoned his biological weapons programs, he retained the scientists and other technicians "needed to restart a potential biological weapons program," and he "intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems [that is, missiles] and . . . the systems potentially were for WMD." These conclusions were based on interviews with Saddam Hussein, his closest advisers, and his weapons scientists, along with the kind of industrial equipment the Iraqi government imported and maintained.

The report also explained that materiel prohibited to Iraq by the UN was arriving in quantity "virtually no problem" from France, China, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and elsewhere.

There is no doubt - none whatsoever - that had the status quo ante bellum continued, my Feb. 2003 assessment for UMNS would have proven tragically true: had we not warred upon Saddam in 2003, we would have faced much more terrible war later.

So what to make of the current Democratic attacks upon the president? Fred Hiatt wrote in the Washington Post Nov. 14, of the "questions" about the use of the intelligence,

"Those aren't irrelevant questions," says Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.). "But the more they dominate the public debate, the harder it is to sustain public support for the war."

What Lieberman doesn't say is that many Democrats would view such an outcome as an advantage. Their focus on 2002 is a way to further undercut President Bush, and Bush's war, without taking the risk of offering an alternative strategy -- to satisfy their withdraw-now constituents without being accountable for a withdraw-now position.

Many of them understand that dwindling public support could force the United States into a self-defeating position, and that defeat in Iraq would be disastrous for the United States as well as for Mahdi and his countrymen. But the taste of political blood as Bush weakens, combined with their embarrassment at having supported the war in the first place, seems to override that understanding.

Michael Barone put it this way:

The Democrats are trying to relitigate the prewar intelligence issue in the hopes of delegitimizing this administration. But in delegitimizing the administration, they also tend to delegitimize the efforts of the U.S. government, including military personnel, in Iraq and generally in the war against Islamic terrorism. To the extent they delegitimize the United States, they are hurting the cause of freedom for millions of people. I do not say the Democrats are being unpatriotic, a word they seem fixated on. So far as I am aware, no responsible Republican has charged that they are unpatriotic; John McCain refused Bob Schieffer's invitation to do so. But I do say this: The Democrats who are peddling the Big Lie of "Bush lied" are doing so either (a) deliberately to injure the cause of the United States and of freedom in the world or, as I think, (b) with reckless disregard of whether they injure the cause of the United States and of freedom in the world. What they are doing may suit their political needs, but it hurts our country.

So Barone shrank from saying "the Democrats are being unpatriotic"? I won't.

Listen, Senators Reid, Rockefeller, former Sen. Edwards, Sen. Kerry and your rhetorical allies: I have known many patriots. My son, fighting in Iraq, is a patriot. And you, sirs, are no patriots. You are actively betraying my son and his comrades. You are giving comfort to the enemy.

Have you no shame? No, I think not.

Update: Senator Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), on the other hand, remains the moral voice of sanity in his party, as he proved yesterday; read the whole thing. Which is, btw, why he gained my support in 2004's Tennessee primary. 

I would also point out that Sen. Hillary Clinton has, on this issue, stood fast with her years-long assertion that Saddam Hussein was a grave threat to the United States and that it was right to remove him from power, although she has been critical of the unpreparedness of the administration for managing Iraq after the campaign.

Monday, September 19, 2005

My address to Gold Star families


I addressed Gold Star Mothers and their families, along with many Blue Star families, at a luncheon honoring fallen U. S. Marines on Sept. 17, 2005. The luncheon was sponsored by Tennessee Marine Families, a chartered not-for-profit organization of which my wife and I are members. Many readers will recognize that I modeled five paragraphs of this address on Pericles' oration at the first funeral of Athens' fallen of the Peloponnesian War in 431 bc. You will also see an echo of Shakespeare's "Henry V" in a closing paragraph.





There was a time in our country when families such as ours did not have to form organizations to offer one another moral and material support because a large percentage of Americans served in the military. Almost every extended family had a member in uniform at one time or another and endured separation or loss like we endure. Families of deployed service members were woven throughout the fabric of every town or city and so was a support structure for them. Today the privilege of service belongs to relatively few Americans, all volunteers - except us. Our sons or daughters - we can no longer call them children - volunteered for military service and then we discovered we had been drafted into another, softer service along with them. Softer service, yes, but not easy.

We have seen our sons or daughters or spouses volunteer for war, prepare for war, go to war. We have, most of us, given an embrace that we dared not think may be the last, taken photographs secretly fearing might be final, given and received tearful kisses hoping with all our hearts that they are promises, not really good-byes. And some us sadly have not welcomed our loved ones home and are living with the grief of fears that became fate.

Without reservations the fallen Marines we memorialize today believed in ideals that formed the very soil from which America grew. They held it self-evident that human beings are endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights. The fundamental premise on which America was founded was that human freedom is the will of God. Over 230 years of our history this idea has become so deeply rooted in the American psyche that even Americans who profess not to believe in God nonetheless say that freedom is the natural condition of human life. Historian and retired infantry officer T. R. Fehrenbach observed that the virtues required to protect a democracy are often at odds with the virtues of democracy. So while we cherish life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as just ends of democratic freedom, our Marines put their lives at risk, surrender many personal liberties and submit to rigorous discipline that is often most unhappy.

Why did they do this? The most reasonable thing to do when battle begins is to run away, not stay and fight. Were they truly willing to die for their country? I don't think so. There's an old story that goes back probably to the Civil War of the young soldier whose commander asked him, "Are you willing to die for your country?" The young man answered, "Certainly not. But I am ready to die, unwilling." The American armed forces really have no use for someone who is willing to die. We do not seek and soon weed out anyone seeking martyrdom in battle; this is a key distinction between us and our enemy. We do not send our soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines to die even though we know some inevitably will. Our country is instead ably protected by those who accept the risk rather than seek it. But why accept it?

What civilians rarely discern but what every veteran knows is that military service, especially in battle, is steeped with the convictions of deepest emotion. In battle there is fear and courage, anger and compassion. There is resignation and determination. There is hope and despair. The chief emotion of the battlefield is an unlikely one. It is love. Across the range of mental, physical and emotional states in the desolation of combat, love abides. Our Marines chose to serve for a variety of reasons, and love of country was a big one. But when enclosed by the mournful mutter of the battlefield, patrolling deserts of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan, men at arms stay where flies the angry iron not for country or flag or other abstractions. In the final sense they fight for their friends. One Iraq veteran wrote,
[T]he first casualty of war is innocence. ... I've found the hard way that war is not glamorous. You quickly lose the idea of being a man fighting for his country when you have to carry your comrade who has been wounded in a gun fight. That nobility is lost quickly. ... It's not about fighting for the flag, it's about fighting for my life and fighting for my buddies' lives. These men I am lucky enough to serve with, I have become so attached to it's like they are my brothers.
A Marine major in Iraq wrote of a young corporal, a squad leader, who, during the invasion of Iraq was wounded by a grenade. This Marine refused evacuation and continued to guide his squad until he passed out from loss of blood.
Recovering at a US Army hospital in Germany, he convinced his doctors to release him, "borrowed" a camouflage uniform from a Navy corpsman, called his wife and told her that he wasn't coming home because his Marines were depending on him, and then talked his way onto an Air Force transport back to Iraq. He had the "golden ticket." He was headed home as a war hero with medals to prove it, but he just couldn't bear to let his Marines down, so he schemed and connived, as only a good Marine NCO can, and got himself back into the fight. There are those who will call that kind of response foolish. Then may God grant that I be such a fool. You may question the wisdom of that Marine, but he's the kind of man you want on your side when the chips are down.
Whether they served in peace or war, the Marines we memorialize today were not so impoverished of spirit that they were unable to surrender the pleasures of life. None of them excused themselves from hard service even though a softer lifestyle could have easily been gained. They deemed that their love of country and duty to freedom were of greater value and more important imperative, so they reckoned that if dangers must be faced, they would face them in the most desirable way, by placing their own mortal bodies "between their loved homes and the war's desolation."

They determined at the hazard of their lives to be honorable in their young adulthood, to make sure of their duty, and to leave everything else for later, if later ever came. They gave over to hope their chance of lifelong happiness and the uncertainty of final success, and in mortal danger they relied only upon themselves, their buddies and the Corps itself. They chose to risk death young as free men rather than live long as conquered ones. And when fearful lethality loomed they resolved to resist and suffer, rather than flee to save their lives; they ran away not from danger but from dishonor. On the battlefield they stood steadfast, and in an instant, at the height of their resolve, they passed away from this life but not from our lives or the destinies of generations yet to come.

Such was the end of these men's lives. We need not desire to have a more heroic spirit than they, although we do pray that others and their families suffer no such fate. The value of their spirit is poorly expressed in words. Anyone can speak to you about the advantages of such devotion, but you know about that already. Instead I hope that we can fix our eyes upon the greatness of our country and of these men's love of it and one another, and reflect that this country was established and has been preserved by men and women who knew their duty and determined to do it even at cost of life.

We should make them our examples. Their courage is our freedom and our freedom is our happiness. We whose loved ones still serve must not weigh too hard on the perils of war. We accept their love of country as our assurance and their service as our blessing. So it is comfort rather than pity I have to offer you, the families of the fallen. There are numberless chances to which lives of men and women are subjected: none of us here is promised even to see our own homes again today or ever.

These Marines' service ended in their honorable deaths and your honorable sorrow. Their passing is truly sad, for which you rightly mourn - but their deaths were not tragic, for tragedy is found in futility and selfishness, never by attaining the great honor of selfless service for freedom's sake. I know how hard it is to hear this, for the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. There is a portal you have passed through that we frankly hope never to cross ourselves. So we honor your grieving and will never forget your sons and husbands.

In gratitude we should offer them praise that does not grow old, and acknowledge they occupy the noblest of all tombs. I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives and is proclaimed whenever people protect their freedom or are liberated from tyranny. For the whole world is the memorial of these Americans; they signed the earth itself with their blood and their honor. Not only are they commemorated here in their own country, but in Iraq and Afghanistan there are countless, unwritten memorials of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of tens of millions of peoples newly freed from murderous oppression.

Because of these men's sacrifice we go safely to our homes. Henceforth we should stand in humility when their names are read. Their comrades in arms who see old age will recall them fondly and show their medals and say, "These ribbons I earned beside true heroes." We will forget many things in years to come but we shall remember these great men and what feats they did one day. These dates shall never go by but that in them our fallen shall be remembered. They were a few, a band of brothers; and may we gratefully call them who shed their blood for us our brothers. And people in our country safe in their beds should think themselves accursed they knew them not, and hold their courage cheap when we speak of those who fought and died for freedom's cause.

The prophet Micah wrote that the time will come when God will judge between all the peoples and will settle disputes between strong nations far and wide. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore. All people will be at peace, and no one will make them afraid (Micah 4:3-4).

Let us pray that day comes quickly. Until then may the Lord watch over those who serve today, to make them instruments of justice, enablers of peace, and finally to see them safely home. To our Gold Star families, may God bless you and keep you and comfort you, from this day until the ending of the world.
_________________________________

In honor of and gratitude for the service and sacrifice of these Marines:
LCpl. Benjamin Gearheart - Franklin, Tennessee
Cpl. Patrick Nixon - Gallatin, Tennessee
Capt. Brent Morel - Martin, Tennessee
Lance Cpl. Jeremiah Savage - Livingston, Tennessee
Pfc. Daniel McClenney - Shelbyville, Tennessee
Lance Cpl. Timothy Creager - Millington, Tennessee
Lance Cpl. Brad McCormick - Allons, Tennessee
1st Lt. Andrew Stern - Germantown, Tennessee
Lance Cpl. Tyler Cates - Mt. Juliet, Tennessee
Sgt. Christopher Heflin - Paducah, Kentucky
Lance Cpl. Joshua Dickinson - Lafayette, Tennessee
Pfc. Nathan Clemons - Winchester, Tennessee
Sgt. Morgan Strader
2nd Lt. Heinz Ahlmeyer 
Added Oct. 2006
: Lance Cpl. Richard A. Buerstetta, Franklin, Tennessee
They will not grow old as we that are left grow old. 
Age shall not weary them nor the year condemn. 
At the going down of the sun 
and in the morning we will remember them.
From, "For the Fallen," Laurence Binyon, 1914

Wednesday, September 14, 2005

To war: Lance Cpl. Stephen Sensing

The future’s fortunes are opaque; 
we see now as through a glass darkly,
and so live each day with fear, faith and hope.



Yesterday my eldest son, Lance Cpl. Stephen Sensing, deployed with his unit to Iraq. His mother, brother, sister and I traveled to Camp Lejeune, NC, to see him off. Cathy’s dad, from Durham, went with us also.

He was released Monday at 10 a.m. until noon Tuesday, so we had a very good visit with him. Then he and his unit drew weapons and gathered their sea bags at the barracks to await transportation. The time of departure slipped a couple of times, but not by much. They shipped out to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, on commercial buses about 30 minutes later than the originally scheduled time.

At MCAS CP they flew by chartered commercial air to Kuwait; I don’t know the route. Just as I was typing the last paragraph, Stephen called from Kuwait to report he arrived fine and there were no problems. He couldn’t talk but a moment, so that’s all the news we got, but it was wonderful to hear his voice and know all was well. He did say he doesn’t know just when they’ll move into Iraq. He does know where they will go, but I’m not going to include that here.


The standard-issue M16A4 rifle. It’s heavier and more rugged than the M16A1 I carried as a young artillery officer. Seeing this picture I am reminded somehow that when our kids were small, I never let them play with toy guns even though I taught them how to shoot the real things. Guns are not playthings but are deadly serious. There’s no doubt that Stephen knows that now.


They wear their name tapes everywhere – back of their covers, above their right breast pocket, above their right rear trouser pocket, on the sling of their rifles, on their seabags and day packs. They lace a dogtag into a bootlace, standard practice at least since World War II. The other two remain around their necks.


There were many “last” embraces, but there was one that you make count and you give it before you know it’s time to watch him run to final roll call. It’s so hard to let go; you want to make time stand still. You barely breathe and try to feel his heartbeat in your own breast because his heart will always beat in yours.


Steve’s grandfather, Col. (ret.) George D. Stephens, USA, is a World War II veteran who made eight combat amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Since those days he’s always had great respect for US Marines.


Final formation. Frederick the Great observed, “Ninety percent of a soldier’s time is spent waiting for something to happen.” So also with Marines! But the wait wasn’t long.


The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Michael L. Kuhn, came by to talk to the company and wish them well. He also read a prayer by the chaplain – why the chaplain didn’t come himself I don’t know (for all I know the battalion chaplain might already be deployed with another element, so I judge not harshly). Lt. Col. Kuhn’s talk was brief, to the point and professional – these Marines need no pumping up. Many of them have fought in Iraq before; in fact, every one of the NCOs in Stephen’s chain of command I met were already combat veterans, which reassured me greatly.


Lt. Col. Kuhn kindly dropped by our little family group after his short talk to the troops. Several families came to see their Marine off and I am pretty sure that the battalion commander spoke to every one. We had a good conversation for quite awhile. I told him what I had told my son the night before, that I was deeply envious of my son and his fellow Marines. Some people reach the end of their lives still wondering whether they ever made a positive difference in their country or the world. Marines don’t have that problem, and neither, of course, do soldiers, sailors, airmen or Coast Guardsmen.
My son and his fellows are producers of freedom, not mere consumers of it. And those who only consumed freedom will one night lie in their beds and think themselves accursed that they didn’t serve with them.

Sunday, May 15, 2005

The fastest jet pilot ever

Transcontinental speed record holder, retired SR-71 pilot Ed Yeilding,
showing a remarkable unconcern about with whom he is photographed.
Today at church I had the pleasure to meet retired Air Force pilot Ed Yeilding, who honored us by attending before he headed home to Alabama. He said he had seen me on The O'Reilly Factor on April 4. In Nashville for a couple of days, he looked me up, which was very kind. Ed was an SR-71 "Blackbird" reconnaissance aircraft pilot for several years. When the plane was retired from service in 1990, 
... an SR-71 (972) accomplished history on a record breaking flight from Los Angeles to Washington, DC Pilot Ed Yielding [sic] and RSO Joseph T. "JT" Vida made the flight in 64 minutes, 54 seconds, averaging 2,144.8 mph, setting the coast- to- coast world speed record. On that historic event, aircraft 972 was turned over to the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum at Dulles International Airport. [link]
Ed Yeilding, right, with co-crewman J.T. Vida
As you may imagine, it is fascinating to talk with Ed in person. There are only about 100 SR-71 pilots, according to Ed, and about that many navigators. It's a very exclusive club! Many thanks to Ed and all his comrades for their invaluable service for well over two decades of the Cold War.

Update: I like this story, too: The King of Speed, US Navy F-18 Hornet v. USAF SR-71, guess who won?

Sunday, April 3, 2005

The Pope and communism's fall

I wrote briefly this week about Pope John Paul's role in bringing about the end of Polish communism, springboarding off an Agence France Press report that said the assassination attempt against the pope's life originated in the Soviet KGB.

Leopold Stoltch writes today that John Paul's role in the fall of communism is "overstated." He cites a quote by Lech Walesa:
"We know what the pope has achieved. Fifty percent of the collapse of communism is his doing," Walesa told The Associated Press on Friday. "More than one year after he spoke these words, we were able to organize 10 million people for strikes, protests and negotiations.

"Earlier we tried, I tried, and we couldn't do it. These are facts. Of course, communism would have fallen, but much later and in a bloody way. He was a gift from the heavens to us."
To which Leopold responds,
It seems to me that Walesa and others completely overstate the Pope's impact on the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. In fact, it has been my position that the Pope (and the Church in general) has been extraordinarily weak in the face of tyranny, always counselling the United States against using military force but never calling the Soviets or other dictatorial regimes to account for their persistent violations of natural law.

The most recent example of this one-sided pacifism occurred when the Pope admonished President Bush not to invade Iraq, but never called on Saddam Hussein to stop murdering his own people. To constantly call for the good to stand down in the face of evil, in the name of allowing peace to come in God's time, seems a contradiction that I can't get over.
I would reply thus: First, it is far too much to credit John Paul II for the fall of communism as a whole. The credit he deserves relates to what he did to bring about the fall of Polish communism. That is what Walesa was addressing. What he did, in conjunction with Walesa's Solidarity movement, was de-legitimize the Polish government and lead, not exactly to its collapse, but to its growing inability to monopolize the political life of the nation. Once men like Walesa found political effectiveness outside the Party, communist rule there was doomed.

The pope visited Poland in 1979, a year before Solidarity was born. By 1982 (IIRC) the Communist government had outlawed Solidarity and had imposed martial law. But John Paul visited Poland again in 1987. Reported the BBC:
When he re-visited Poland in 1987, the Polish leader, General Jaruzelski, and the Communist leadership gave the Pope the welcome due to a foreign Head of State. But the pomp and ceremony could not disguise the authorities' nervousness. Television viewers noted the General's trembling voice. The battle for the Polish soul was an unequal one. In a sonorous baritone, as yet untouched by the Parkinson's Disease that afflicts him today, the Pope told the customary huge crowds that came to greet him what many wanted to hear... ."
There was still a long, hard row to hoe before the Warsaw Pact broke up, followed by the Soviet empire itself. The Polish political revolution was not the foundation of the fall of Soviet empire, it was a big crack in the wall. The foundation was Communist East Germany. When the people there threw off the authority of the government, the whole facade collapsed and the Soviet empire - indeed, the Soviet Union itself - was shown to be a house of cards, politically speaking.

John Paul's role in the revolution in East Germany was nil. The locus of resistance there was the Protestant Lutheran church, not the Catholic church. But I hold that without the example of the Polish resistance the East Germans would likely not have been so bold.

As for John Paul's one-sidedness in dealing with Saddam, I have no explanation. But this article by Father Raymond J. de Souza, writing from Rome in 2003 sheds a lot of light, I think. It first appeared in the National Catholic Register.
George Weigel, the papal biographer, once asked his subject what he learned from the Second World War. Pope John Paul II answered instantly: "I learned the experience of my contemporaries: humiliation at the hands of evil."

The moral of the war story for so much of Europe is just that: humiliation and evil. ...

The Holy See, too, felt the pain of humiliation, with the tiny Vatican City State surrounded. The Church felt compelled to moderate her voice to preserve the neutrality upon which her freedom depended. It was a defensible policy but there was no glory in it — there was only humiliation in the face of evil.

Indeed, with the exception of Poland — which fought bravely and lost — and Britain — which fought bravely and won — the moral of the war story for Europe was that, as John Paul is fond of saying, "nothing is solved by war." The subsequent Cold War only reinforced the view that war brings more evils in its wake and further underscored the impotence of free Europe to combat evil in its own neighborhood. ...

So the Iraq war has produced an odd situation. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair are men of deep Christian faith, explicitly motivated by the morality of their policy and committed to the role of religion in public life. Yet the Holy See has opposed them every step of the way.
De Souza's point is that Europeans generally do not see military force as being inside the moral universe, that war is purely destructive, never politically liberating. See also, Janet Dalety piece in the UK Telegraph, "Freedom? Why Europe's not bothered."

(Catholic theologian George Weigel, cited by de Souza, has also written extensively on the theology of war. I've discussed his works five times. See this index.)

Update: Arthur Chrenkoff was a child in Krakow when John Paul visited there in 1983.
My John Paul, not surprisingly, is the political Pope, the Polish Pope, the one who helped to bring down the Soviet Empire. There is no doubt in my mind about the role he played in this grand spectacle of history. Forget all the rather silly theories about cooperation with the CIA, or some "holy alliance" with President Reagan; he made a difference not on the account of some covert shenanigans but because of who he was, what he said and what he did out in the open, in front of the billions.

If you distill it all into one word, it is this: hope. He gave us hope. By us, I mean initially the Poles, the troublemakers who in 1980 started rocking the communist boat ...
Read the whole thing.

Saturday, April 2, 2005

Pope John Paul II and Polish communism's fall

Leopold Stoltch writes today that John Paul's role in the fall of communism is "overstated." He cites a quote by Lech Walesa:

"We know what the pope has achieved. Fifty percent of the collapse of communism is his doing," Walesa told The Associated Press on Friday. "More than one year after he spoke these words, we were able to organize 10 million people for strikes, protests and negotiations. "Earlier we tried, I tried, and we couldn't do it. These are facts. Of course, communism would have fallen, but much later and in a bloody way. He was a gift from the heavens to us."
To which Leopold responds,
It seems to me that Walesa and others completely overstate the Pope's impact on the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. In fact, it has been my position that the Pope (and the Church in general) has been extraordinarily weak in the face of tyranny, always counselling the United States against using military force but never calling the Soviets or other dictatorial regimes to account for their persistent violations of natural law. The most recent example of this one-sided pacifism occurred when the Pope admonished President Bush not to invade Iraq, but never called on Saddam Hussein to stop murdering his own people. To constantly call for the good to stand down in the face of evil, in the name of allowing peace to come in God's time, seems a contradiction that I can't get over.
I would reply thus: First, it is far too much to credit John Paul II for the fall of communism as a whole. The credit he deserves relates to what he did to bring about the fall of Polish communism. That is what Walesa was addressing. What he did, in conjunction with Walesa's Solidarity movement, was de-legitimize the Polish government and lead, not exactly to its collapse, but to its growing inability to monopolize the political life of the nation. Once men like Walesa found political effectiveness outside the Party, communist rule there was doomed. The pope visited Poland in 1979, a year before Solidarity was born. By 1982 (IIRC) the Communist government had outlawed Solidarity and had imposed martial law. But John Paul visited Poland again in 1987. Reported the BBC:
When he re-visited Poland in 1987, the Polish leader, General Jaruzelski, and the Communist leadership gave the Pope the welcome due to a foreign Head of State. But the pomp and ceremony could not disguise the authorities' nervousness. Television viewers noted the General's trembling voice. The battle for the Polish soul was an unequal one. In a sonorous baritone, as yet untouched by the Parkinson's Disease that afflicts him today, the Pope told the customary huge crowds that came to greet him what many wanted to hear... ."
There was still a long, hard row to hoe before the Warsaw Pact broke up, followed by the Soviet empire itself. The Polish political revolution was not the foundation of the fall of Soviet empire, it was a big crack in the wall. The foundation was Communist East Germany. When the people there threw off the authority of the government, the whole facade collapsed and the Soviet empire - indeed, the Soviet Union itself - was shown to be a house of cards, politically speaking. John Paul's role in the revolution in East Germany was nil. The locus of resistance there was the Protestant Lutheran church, not the Catholic church. But I hold that without the example of the Polish resistance the East Germans would likely not have been so bold. As for John Paul's one-sidedness in dealing with Saddam, I have no explanation. But this article by Father Raymond J. de Souza, writing from Rome in 2003 sheds a lot of light, I think. It first appeared in the National Catholic Register.
George Weigel, the papal biographer, once asked his subject what he learned from the Second World War. Pope John Paul II answered instantly: "I learned the experience of my contemporaries: humiliation at the hands of evil." The moral of the war story for so much of Europe is just that: humiliation and evil. ... The Holy See, too, felt the pain of humiliation, with the tiny Vatican City State surrounded. The Church felt compelled to moderate her voice to preserve the neutrality upon which her freedom depended. It was a defensible policy but there was no glory in it — there was only humiliation in the face of evil. Indeed, with the exception of Poland - which fought bravely and lost -and Britain - which fought bravely and won - the moral of the war story for Europe was that, as John Paul is fond of saying, "nothing is solved by war." The subsequent Cold War only reinforced the view that war brings more evils in its wake and further underscored the impotence of free Europe to combat evil in its own neighborhood. ... So the Iraq war has produced an odd situation. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair are men of deep Christian faith, explicitly motivated by the morality of their policy and committed to the role of religion in public life. Yet the Holy See has opposed them every step of the way.
De Souza's point is that Europeans generally do not see military force as being inside the moral universe, that war is purely destructive, never politically liberating. See also, Janet Dalety piece in the UK Telegraph, "Freedom? Why Europe's not bothered." 
Update: Arthur Chrenkoff was a child in Krakow when John Paul visited there in 1983.
My John Paul, not surprisingly, is the political Pope, the Polish Pope, the one who helped to bring down the Soviet Empire. There is no doubt in my mind about the role he played in this grand spectacle of history. Forget all the rather silly theories about cooperation with the CIA, or some "holy alliance" with President Reagan; he made a difference not on the account of some covert shenanigans but because of who he was, what he said and what he did out in the open, in front of the billions. If you distill it all into one word, it is this: hope. He gave us hope. By us, I mean initially the Poles, the troublemakers who in 1980 started rocking the communist boat ...
Read the whole thing.

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Soviets tried to kill Pope

 Agence France Presse is reporting that the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II in 1981 - which almost did kill him - was ordered by the old Soviet KGB, the "Committee for State Security." Comments Civil Commotion,

This has been rumored for a long while, of course, and it is totally believable. It was John Paul II who went to Poland during Lech Walesa?s Solidarity uprising, defying the old Soviet Union to stop him, and kicked-off the disintegration of the USSR.
In fact, the Vatican and President Ronald Reagan's administration closely coordinated subverting the Communist government of Poland, the Pope's home country. That came after the assassination attempt, of course, since Reagan entered office only in 1981.

However, the man who took the name John Paul II when elected Pope had been a staunch anti-communist resister in Poland for years. In the early 1970s,
... Karol Cardinal Wojtyla emerged as a strong advocate of human rights and promoted an independent intellectual life. In 1974 Communist Party ideologue Andrej Werbian called the Cardinal "the only real ideological threat in Poland."
Wojtyla is, of course, John Paul's Polish name. Wojtyla was elected Pope in 1978, just before the Solidarity workers' movement was gaining its steam, led by electrician Lech Walesa.
In August 1980 [Walesa] led the Gdansk shipyard strike which gave rise to a wave of strikes over much of the country with Walesa seen as the leader. The primary demands were for workers' rights. The authorities were forced to capitulate and to negotiate with Walesa the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980, which gave the workers the right to strike and to organise their own independent union.

If any one event had helped to create the psychological climate in which Solidarity trades union emerged, it was the visit of Pope John Paul II to his homeland in June 1979. From the moment that the Pope knelt in Warsaw's airport to kiss the ground, he was cheered wildly by millions of Poles. John Paul never criticized the Communist regime directly, nor did he have to: his meaning was plain enough. "The exclusion of Christ from the history of man is an act against man," he told an enormous outdoor congregation in Warsaw. With that hardly veiled allusion to Communism, a deafening roar of approval filled the great city square. Says a Polish bishop of that day: "The Polish people broke the barrier of fear. They were hurling a challenge at their Marxist rulers."

During the August 1980 defiance of the communist authorities, the Lenin shipyard functioned as the emotional center of an extraordinary national movement. Festooned with flowers, white and red Polish flags and portraits of Pope John Paul II, the plant's iron gates came to symbolize that heady mixture of hope, faith and patriotism that sustained the workers through their vigil. ...
Then in January 1981 Pope John Paul received Walesa at the Vatican and met with him privately for thirty minutes, an unusual honor for a layman of the Church.

In May of that year, Mehmet Ali Agca, an escaped Turkish killer, shot John Paul twice while the Pope was riding in his "Popemobile," a convertible he used to wave to crowds while standing as the vehicle moved along. According to AFP's wire report,
New documents found in the files of the former East German intelligence services confirm the 1981 assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II was ordered by the Soviet KGB and assigned to Bulgarian agents, an Italian daily said on Wednesday. ...

Bulgaria then handed the execution of the plot to Turkish extremists, including Mehmet Ali Agca, who pulled the trigger.
It's doubtful that Agca ever knew who actually was paying him. In December 1983, John Paul met with Agca in prison.
"We talked for a long time. Ali Agca is, as everyone says, a professional assassin. Which means that the assassination was not his initiative, that someone else thought of it, someone else gave the order," he wrote.

"During the entire conversation, it was clear that Ali Agca was burdened by the question: How did it happen that the assassination was unsuccessful? He did everything that was necessary, he took care of the tiniest detail of his plan. But still the victim avoided death. How could this have happened?"
Agca had shot John Paul in the arm and the abdomen. John Paul himself said that divine intervention had steered the latter bullet away from his vital organs. He has never said whom he thought was behind the plot to kill him, but did attribute the attempt to convulsions of "the 20th century ideologies of force." In 2002, however, John Paul said that he did not believe there was a Bulgarian connection to his assailant.

Thursday, March 3, 2005

A history of Arab terrorism


Copyright © 2005 Donald Sensing

It was in the latter third of the twentieth century that "terrorist" became strongly associated with "Arab" in the West. The words were welded in the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich. Images broadcast worldwide of armed, hooded Palestinian terrorists peering from the balcony of Israeli athletes' apartments were powerfully fearful. The terrorists, members of the Black September faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, took eleven Israelis hostage and brokered a deal with German authorities to be flown by helicopter to a NATO air base. There, an airliner was to fly them all to Cairo.


The German police thought there were five terrorists. Five snipers were assigned to kill the terrorists before they boarded the helicopters. But there were eight terrorists. Nonetheless, the police attempted to carry out their plan. A brief firefight ensued that ended badly. All the Israelis died, along with five terrorists and one German policeman.
For many years afterward, the images and narrative from the Munich games defined Arab terrorism in much of the West.
Three stages of Arab terrorism
Terrorism has been used by peoples and nationalities around the world throughout history, but the terrorism carried out by Muslims has for several decades has either been done by Arab Muslims (i.e., all nineteen hijackers of Sept. 11, 2001) or has been inspired by Arab sponsors or teachers (Abu Sayyef terrorists in the Philippines). Hence, the problem of Muslim terrorism is almost exclusively a problem of Arab terrorism.
Modern Arab terrorism has gone through three stages. The first was a revival of strict Islamic devotion. Islamism, as the movement came to be called, was originally a reform movement calling secularized Arab governments and societies to return to the basics of pure Islam as the reformers defined it. Islamism began in Egypt in the early 1920s. It was and still is fundamentally religious in nature. It was not originally violent but became violent fairly soon; Islamists believed that they were obligated to strike those who defied Islam as Islamists perceived it. For many decades afterward, and still significantly today, the targets of Islamist terrorists were Arab governments. Islamism's goal was the institution of strict Islamic law, sharia, in Muslim countries and the rooting out of all non-Muslim influences in the ordering of societies.
The second stage of Arab terrorism was born by the displacement of Palestinian Arabs from their homes by the United Nations' establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. When it became obvious that Israel would not be defeated in conventional battle, as the wars of 1948 and 1956 proved, armed Palestinian groups arose to fight the Israelis. [1]
These groups were essentially secular-political in outlook rather than Islamic; nationalism was a strong ideal in the Middle East at the time. For example, the famed Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO, was founded in 1964 as an umbrella Palestinian nationalist organization, not a religious one, to coordinate the tactics and strategy of several existing violent and political groups. While the PLO used terrorism to fight Israel, it did not overlay Islamism atop its agenda. Palestinian-based terrorism, ultimately supported by Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and many other Arab governments, has always been the most active Arab terrorism, even after Osama bin Laden founded al Qaeda, whose attacks, while more lethal and sensational, have not been nearly as numerous as those of Palestinian-based groups. [2].
Black September's attack in Munich was a variant of anti-Israel violence, not an attack upon the West generally nor even Germany specifically. The attack's basic goal was to force Western governments to pay attention to Palestinian grievances.
By the end Soviet war in Afghanistan many thousands of Arab men had embraced Islamism and jihadism. Arab terrorism reached its third stage in the early 1990s. Henceforth, Islamist terrorism would be directed not only at insufficiently Islamic governments or Israel, but also directly at the West, especially the United States.

Why did they attack us?
In the aftermath of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, many Americans, shocked that they would be so suddenly and brutally attacked, asked, “Why do they hate us?” It seemed that the question was asked mostly by a sector of Americans who already had some answers readily at hand, namely, that we were attacked because America was a cultural and economic imperialist power that was at best resented by the Third World and more commonly hated. The barely-unspoken presumption was that we got what was rightfully coming to us.
Anatol Lieven wrote in the London Review of Books that America is “a menace to itself and to mankind.” MIT’s Professor Noam Chomsky repeatedly characterized the United States as the world’s major terrorist state. At the other end of the ideological spectrum was the Rev. Jerry Falwell, a nationally-known, politically active, Baptist pastor in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell claimed on a broadcast of The 700 Club only two days after 9/11 that the attacks were God's judgment on America for abortion, feminism, homosexuality and liberal organizations such as the ACLU. (He retracted on CNN on September 14.) Such statements from the far Left and far Right are representative of the verbal vitriol that American and western European figures have hurled at America to “explain” the attacks [3].
It took months for non-superficial explanations to appear in the mainstream media. Why so long? At an address at Hillsdale College, journalist Brit Hume said in April 2003 that “the idea that those who attacked America were themselves illegitimate – indeed, even evil – is not the kind of thing that springs to the minds of the people responsible for Newsweek cover stories. What springs to their minds is that we’ve done something wrong.” With our own citizens and other Westerners saying such things, and finding an amplifier in the media, it became easy to believe that non-Westerners of the world must really despise us.
With less intensity, the explanation of Arab terrorism as springing from poverty and hopelessness found support on both sides of America’s political aisle. “We fight against poverty,” President George W. Bush said in a speech in Monterrey, Mexico, “because hope is an answer to terror. ... We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize.”
Former Vice President Al Gore argued that the anger underlying terrorism in the Islamic world stemmed from “the continued failure to thrive, as rates of economic growth stagnate, while the cohort of unemployed young men under twenty continues to increase.”[4]
The problem with this explanation is that it does not explain. Its root is the immiserization thesis of Marxism, as redefined in the 1950s by Paul Baran, a Polish-born American economist and a Marxist. Baran took Marx’s idea that capitalism immiserates workers and applied it to the worldwide economy. America, a capitalist nation, automatically makes the rest of the world poorer and more miserable. About twenty years later, Immanuel Wallerstein wrote an elaborate intellectual reinforcement of Baran’s thesis, and their revisions of Marxist theory really define Marxism today. [5]
However, disciplined research rebuts the idea that poverty, in itself, breeds terrorism. Many commentators have noted that the nineteen hijackers of 9/11 hailed from the privileged classes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; ringleader Mohammed Atta held advanced university degrees, for example.
Professor Alberto Abadie of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government completed extensive research on the relationship between poverty and terrorism, published in November 2004. He told the university's newspaper, "In the past, we heard people refer to the strong link between terrorism and poverty, but when you look at the data, it's not there. This is true not only for events of international terrorism but also for the overall level of terrorism, both of domestic and of foreign origin." [6] He summarized his conclusions in his paper succinctly,
I fail to find a significant association between terrorism and economic variables such as income once the effect of other country characteristics is taken into account. ... The estimates suggest, however, that political freedom has a non-monotonic effect on terrorism. This result is consistent with the observed increase in terrorism for countries in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies. In addition, the results show that certain geographic characteristics may favor the presence of terrorism. [7]
Another study rebutting a linkage between poverty and terrorism was done by Alan B. Krueger, professor of economics and public policy at Princeton University, and Jitka Malecková, professor of Middle Eastern studies at Charles University in Prague. In June 2003, The Chronicle of Higher Education published their paper, “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism." Krueger and Malecková concluded,
Instead of viewing terrorism as a response . . . to poverty or ignorance, we suggest that it is more accurately viewed as a response to [the terrorists’ own] political conditions and longstanding feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economic circumstances. We suspect that is why international terrorist acts are more likely to be committed by people who grew up under repressive political regimes. [8]
Asking, "Why do they hate us?" really misses the point. It is more fruitful to ask why the political repression of the Arab people by Arab governments leads their more privileged members to attack us.
Even before the United States launched offensive operations against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, President Bush was taking pains to point out that America was not making war against Islam itself, but against those who wage war against us or support the terrorists.
Arabs account for only about twenty percent of Muslims worldwide. There are tens of millions more Muslims in Indonesia than in all the Arab lands combined. There are enormous numbers of non-Arab Muslims who are not unified in rage against America. Islam today is much greater than Arab Islam.
However, it is impossible to speak meaningfully about Islam without being immersed in Arab history. Since the conquest by Arabian armies of northern Africa, the eastern Mediterranean coast and lands to the east and north, the rise and fall of Arab culture has been almost identical with the rise and fall of Islam itself. Islam did not wipe clean everything Arabic that came before it, but it did alter or subsume everything. It was among the Arabs that radicalized Islamic revivalist movements began, and it was from them that it has spread to other Muslim areas.

Muslim expansionism and Western response
Within a mere eighty-one years after the death of Mohammed, Islam came to dominate land masses from the Arabian Peninsula to the Atlantic Ocean. Muslim armies stormed into Europe from the east and the southwest. Spain fell under Arab domination in 713 and was not fully freed until 1492. In 732, an Arab army under Abd er Rahman marched toward Paris; it was defeated near Tours by Charles Martel.
By the tenth century, the best army and navy in Europe were Muslim, under the command of Abd ar-Rahman III of Spain. “The cultural achievements of his caliphate . . . [were] unmatched by any Christian or Muslim state. The period of his reign (and really until 1031) marks the Golden Age of both Arab and Jewish culture in Spain.” [9]
The Muslim Ottoman Turks penetrated into eastern Europe as far north as Poland, and into Russia all the way to St. Petersburg, where there is still today a large, active mosque.
Arab naval raiders reached England, the west coast of Europe and even Iceland. For hundreds of years Islamic civilization was the historical pinnacle of world history in almost every category and was far more religiously tolerant than Christendom, especially for Jews and sectarian Christians. The West was almost constantly on the defensive; the cultural and religious survival of Europe was, as Wellington would later describe Waterloo, a close-run thing.
It was fashionable for awhile after Sept. 11's infamy to blame the East’s hatred of the West on the Crusades. The Crusades were a series of eight major invasions by European armies of near-Eastern lands that occurred intermittently from 1095-1291. Their main focus was wresting Jerusalem from Muslim control, in which they were successful for awhile. The Crusaders established kingdoms in Syria and Palestine, but these were small and penetrated no more than about fifty miles into Arab lands.
At their end, as Princeton University's Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out, the Crusades ended in the defeat of the Crusaders; the Crusades were a Muslim victory. By 1300, Muslim armies were so decisively victorious in the Middle East that European armies did not return for five hundred years, when they were much more successful due to technological advantage and their own modern economies.
The present-day effects of the Crusades are debated among historians. Karen Armstrong made a strong case in Holy War: the Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World that Europeans after the Crusades saw Islam as "the irreconcilable enemy of Western civilization" and that the "hatred and suspicion" of the Christian West by Muslims engendered by the Crusades "still reverberates," including specifically in the 9/11 attacks.
Osama bin Laden has repeatedly referred to Western powers, especially the United States, as "Crusaders." He has called the American military response to Islamist terrorism a new Crusade against Islam. Yet he has not said that his campaign of terror is intended to avenge the Crusades. His objective is to inculcate Islamism in Muslim countries today, not seek revenge for a series of battles beginning almost a millennium ago.
Professor Thomas Madden wrote in “Crisis” in April 2002 that although scholars are still working out the truth about the Crusades, "much can already be said with certainty":                
For starters, the Crusades to the East were in every way defensive wars. They were a direct response to Muslim aggression – an attempt to turn back or defend against Muslim conquests of Christian lands. ...
With enormous energy, the warriors of Islam struck out against the Christians shortly after Mohammed’s death. They were extremely successful. ... The old Roman Empire, known to modern historians as the Byzantine Empire, was reduced to little more than Greece. In desperation, the emperor in Constantinople sent word to the Christians of western Europe asking them to aid their brothers and sisters in the East.
That is what gave birth to the Crusades. They were not the brainchild of an ambitious pope or rapacious knights but a response to more than four centuries of conquests in which Muslims had already captured two-thirds of the old Christian world. At some point, Christianity as a faith and a culture had to defend itself or be subsumed by Islam. The Crusades were that defense. [10]
After the last Crusade was vanquished, the Islamic caliphate counter-attacked. In 1480, Sultan
Sultan Mehmed II
Mehmed II captured Italy's easternmost town, Otranto, and razed it. He intended to use it as a port for the conquest of Italy itself. The danger was so great that Rome was evacuated, but Mehmed died and nothing came of his plans. The overland route into Europe, through the Balkans, was repeatedly invaded by Muslim armies; one under Suleiman the Magnificent was defeated at Vienna not by European arms but by a rainstorm that negated his use of artillery.
Yet by the end of the seventeenth century, the tide had turned. After the Ottoman army was decisively defeated at Vienna in 1683, Islam began a retreat that many say has not yet ended, a retreat encompassing not only the military realm, but the commercial, economic, political, scientific and social.
The Muslim eclipse and the Muslim response
The Muslim world began to be eclipsed by the West well before its final siege of Vienna and has lived in the West’s shadow ever since. It is historically ironic that the Islamic spearhead against the West for hundreds of years was the Ottoman regime, headed not by Arabs but by Muslim Turks. Yet today the Turks are formally allied with Europe and the United States in NATO and Turkey is the best example of democracy to be found among Islamic nations.
Beginning about 330 years ago, wrote Bernard Lewis,
Muslims began to feel threatened by the rise and expansion of the great Christian empires of Eastern and Western Europe. The old easy-going tolerance, resting on an assumption not only of superior religion but also of superior power, was becoming difficult to maintain. The threat that Christendom now seemed to be offering to Islam was no longer merely political and military; it was beginning to shake the very structure of Muslim society. [11]
With varying degrees of enthusiasm, the Muslims’ ruling and intellectual classes across the near-Eastern lands began to understand that no longer could they merely observe what was happening in Europe, they had to imitate Europe in order to have any chance of competing with it. The list of things the Turks and later the Arabs adopted from Europe is long, but two of them bear particular weight today. The first is the triplet concept of nationhood, citizenship and patriotism, which were never native to the near-eastern Muslims. Even today they have not sunk in very far. The Arab culture is generally oriented around the tribe and the clan, loyalty to which still defines the second level of how most Arab societies are organized today. (The first level is Islam.) 
Abdul Gamel Nasser
The attempt to adopt these triplet concepts finally resulted in pan-Arabism, a movement for the unification of the Arab peoples at a political level. Closely related to Arab nationalism – the ideology that all Arabs are one people, united by language, culture and history – pan-Arabism was first pressed about a century ago. It found renewed vigor in the 1950s as a means to defeat Israel on the one hand and on the other to strengthen Arab culture and identity against the West. Its primary spokesmen in those days were Syrian and Egyptian, both countries being ruled by secular parties. Egyptian President Abdul Gamel Nasser (1918-1970) was a tireless worker for pan-Arabism. In fact, he led Syria and Egypt to merge into a single state in 1958 called the United Arab Republic. But the UAR dissolved only three years later after a coup in Syria.
The inability of pan-Arabist-inclined governments to generate economic growth, coupled with the stunning defeat of both Egypt and Syria by Israel in 1967's Six Day War, led to pan-Arabism's decline as an ideal. The highly westernized and charismatic Nasser could not succeed in making pan-Arabic nationalism work, and the concept pretty much died along with him. [12]
The second European concept adopted with varying strength across Arab lands was political also. The Arabs generally began to reclaim political autonomy only in the early 1900s. Having been dominated by European countries, they adopted variants of European economic models. But they did so at exactly the wrong time: when European socialism was first burgeoning but before its inherent weaknesses became evident. Canadian journalist David Warren grew up in Pakistan, an Islamic state. He wrote that Arab leaders most often,
... became socialists of one kind or another, for in the world of only a few decades ago, that very Western ideology of ‘socialism’ could still be presented as the coming thing, as a ‘scientific’ thing, the cutting edge of progress. Most came to believe that the best way to modernize their societies was through central planning, and that their own class was in effect the socialist vanguard. [13]
But political-economic socialism requires a coherent national order. The post-colonial Arab leaders attempted to make Western-style nations of peoples whose historical social structure was ancient nomadic Bedouinism. Their socialist and nationalist plans, wrote Warren, became “a catastrophe. ... None of [their] five-year plans ever worked. And the only thing that did work was the elites clinging to power, trying to Westernize or modernize their societies with increasing frustration.”
The economic stagnation of Arab countries was coupled with increasing Westernization of Arab elites. According to Warren, in recent decades the leadership of the Arab countries was “quite well acquainted with the broad cosmopolitan world of modernity,” [14] and had been educated in European universities.  “And while they remained Muslim, at least nominally, they were also secularized [and] tended, unconsciously or even consciously, to look upon their own religious inheritance as backward, inferior, incapable of competing.”
The self-immiserization of the Arabs
It was not the West that immiserated the people of the Arab lands; it has been their own governments, usually meaning dictators, attempting to imitate the West. They failed because the patina of westernization they adopted was unsuitable for their native culture and was incomplete in any event: the Arabs never adopted a capitalist system, but attempted to make European-style socialism work anyway. But even in Europe, socialism is capitalist at heart. [15]
In America, power follows money. One makes a lot of money and then uses the money to gain power. In the Near East, money follows power. One uses or gains power in order to garner wealth. This is exactly the model Saddam Hussein followed, for example, although much more brutally than most Arabs had done before, and it has been what the House of Saud has done since Franklin Roosevelt’s concordance with it in World War II imbued it with international legitimacy.
The enormous infusion of dollars into oil-producing Arab states followed the Arab oil embargo after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Without raising production, the Arab states tripled their oil revenues,[16] especially Saudi Arabia, whose money is the irrigation stream of Arab terrorism today.
Petrodollars have not resulted in as much improvement of the lives of ordinary Arabs as might be expected, given the enormous revenues oil has garnered. The vast majority of oil dollars have stuck to the fingers of the ruling classes. Oil’s effect has been to depress severely every other economic activity in the Arab lands. For that reason, some Arab writers have called the oil economies, “golden manacles.” The net export of non-petroleum products out of all the Arabs countries combined is less than that of Finland. The non-oil component of the combined gross domestic products of the Arab oil states is less than that of Israel.
Westernization has, however, resulted in some improvements in the material life of the Arab peoples. The Western idea of a comprehensive education system has taken root in almost every Arab country, although women are still generally very limited in what they may study. Over the decades, Arab cities began to show clear Western influences, especially in improvements in infrastructure and sanitation. Western architecture is prominent, if not actually dominant, in some new Arab cities, especially in the oil states.
Even so, Arab leaders could not use Western means to achieve Western-like successes without giving real power to the people. This they did not want to do. Arab culture is very strongly patriarchal. There is no tradition of gender, social or economic egalitarianism, though women's rights wax and wane across different Arab lands. This is critical, because in the Arab lands today, the concentration of wealth and the concentration of political power are in the same hands, unlike the West from late medieval times on, where commerce led wealth to be concentrated in the hands of those who had no inherited political position. But in the Arab countries, there are no economic centers to challenge the ruling despots because the despots are the economic centers.
Many Arab scholars know these things, of course. In 2005 the Arab Human Development Report was issued under United Nations’ auspices by a group of Arab social scientists. Thomas Friedman summarized it thus: [17]
The report notes that most Arab states today resemble "a 'black hole,' which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes." All political parties, institutions, courts, intelligence services, police and media are centralized in the hands of the Arab leader - that's why the "modern-day Arab state is frequently dubbed 'the intelligence state.' " What all these states have in common, the report says, "is that power is concentrated at the tip of the executive pyramid and that the margin of freedom permitted (which can be swiftly reduced) has no effect on the state's firm and absolute grip on power." But without a majority of people behind them, all of these Arab regimes lack legitimacy. …
The chain constricting freedom, the report notes, "completes its circle in the political realm, squeezing Arab public life into a small and constricted space. ... This complicated process has led Arab citizens, including some among the intelligentsia, to a state of submission fed by fear and marked by denial of their subjugation."
All these things, developing over time, were fertile ground for a religious reactionary movement among the masses.
The religious reaction
Beginning in the 1970s, large movements of young Arabs occurred from the rural areas to the cities because of a population explosion after World War II. (Middle Eastern countries have a very young population, which is one reason Iran today is a socio-political and religious powder keg.) Gilles Kepel, head of the post-graduate program on the Arab and Muslim worlds at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, explains [18] that this generation was the first mostly literate one as well. Because they could read and decipher religious texts Islamist propaganda was soon directed their way. Says Kepel,
Yet the younger generation, in facing the challenges that confronted them in this strange environment, could hardly draw on their newly acquired written culture. Because they had acquired this cultural capital, they had ‘great expectations’ – which were not met – and this led to social deprivation on quite a new scale.
Such experiences were all the more bitter in the 1970s, as this was also the first generation to reach adulthood without any living memory of the colonial era. As a result, they tended to take the political elite in power at its word. The latter, young people believed, was accountable for what it had delivered (or, in most cases, not delivered). This created a huge feeling of disarray, of relative deprivation, of social frustration – and, in consequence, a desire to find a language which would be able to decipher the evils of society, and to bring about an alternative.
Because Arab oil wealth enriched some Arab states and not others, a great economic divide came to be opened for the first time among the Arab masses. The overall effect of Westernization has been, as Kepel noted, to leave many Arabs in a state of relative deprivation. They are overall better off than they were, say, before World War II, but relative to their political masters, the West and even from one Arab nation to another, they see themselves as getting the short end of the stick.
"Relative deprivation" is a term of art among religious historians. Among very religious communities, whether Islamic, Jewish or Christian, relative deprivation often leads to eschatological fervor. Eschatology is a religious hope for an ideal, religiously pure time. And this soil was also fertile for the work of Islamic revivalists who had begun about 80 years ago to challenge Westernization on religious grounds. They increasingly succeeded because they had the intellectual-religious tools necessary for the task.
Their eschatology was that the Westernization of their Arab cultures had corrupted the Arab cultures and was apostate to Islam. By rejecting Westernism and practicing strict Islam, their societies would recover their authenticity and pure Islam would be recovered, yielding ideal societies. As Ian Buruma wrote in “The New York Times Magazine” (Nov. 5, 2004), "The religious revolution that now stalks the Muslim world has come as a reaction, in part, to the failure of modern secular politics."
There were other crucial contributing factors. Khaled Abou El Fadl, professor of Islamic law at UCLA's School of Law, wrote that the classical period of Islamic civilization was marked by a high degree of discourse, a tolerance for disputation and a firm grounding in moral philosophy and principled thinking. Terrorism in classical Islamic jurisprudence was unconditionally condemned: "Regardless of the desired goals or ideological justifications, the terrorizing of the defenseless was recognized as a moral wrong and an offense against society and God." But classical Islam has disappeared. Continues Prof. El Fadl,
Much has changed in the modern age. Islamic civilization has crumbled, and the traditional institutions that once sustained the juristic discourse have all but vanished. The moral foundations that once mapped out Islamic law and theology have disintegrated, leaving an unsettling vacuum. More to the point, the juristic discourses on tolerance towards rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no longer part of the normative categories of contemporary Muslims. Contemporary Muslim discourses either give lip service to the classical doctrines without a sense of commitment or ignore and neglect them all together.
There are many factors that contributed to this modern reality. Among the pertinent factors is the undeniably traumatic experience of colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions of civil society. The emergence of highly centralized, despotic and often corrupt governments, and the nationalization of the institutions of religious learning undermined the mediating role of jurists in Muslim societies. Nearly all charitable religious endowments became state-controlled entities, and Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations became salaried state employees, effectively transforming them into what may be called "court priests." The establishment of the state of Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinians and the persistent military conflicts in which Arab states suffered heavy losses all contributed to a widespread siege mentality and a highly polarized and belligerent political discourse. Perhaps most importantly, Western cultural symbols, modes of production and social values aggressively penetrated the Muslim world, seriously challenging inherited values and practices, and adding to a profound sense of alienation. [19]
At first, Islamists' enemies were other Arabs – the political classes who had tried to institute Westernization in the first place. The first significant group of Islamists was the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Hasan al-Banna
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, a 22-year-old elementary school teacher, as an Islamic revivalist movement. Al-Banna emphasized that Islam was a comprehensive way of life. Over the next twenty years the Brotherhood’s ideology came to encompass religion, education and politics. It became terrorist inside Egypt not long after its founding and was outlawed. A Muslim Brother assassinated Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi in December 1948. Al-Banna himself was killed by government agents in Cairo in February, 1949.
The Egyptian government legalized the Brotherhood again in 1948, but only as a religious organization; it was banned again in 1954 because it insisted that Egypt be governed under sharia, or Islamic law. The brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser four times and four of its members assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981.
The Brotherhood’s slogan is, “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Quran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” The Brotherhood served as a model for subsequent revivalist movements and is theologically aligned with Saudi Wahhabism. The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Islamist movement and its terrorist wings need to be distinguished from secular Arab movements. One way to do so is by looking at their respective targets. Until the rise of al Qaeda, Islamist terrorism was directed mostly inward, toward secular-leaning Arab governments. In contrast, terrorism directed against Israel was done primarily by Arab secular-nationalist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization. From its beginning, the PLO was oriented toward the reclamation of land and homes lost to Arabs by the founding of the state of Israel in 1948.  An example of secular-based terrorist group operating against Israel is the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, a homegrown group behind the rash of suicide bombings against Israelis in the second Intifada of 2002-2004. The Brigades are affiliated with the al-Fatah faction of the PLO. However, as Iran’s Islamic revolution solidified its grip, its mullahs began sponsoring Islamist terrorist groups against Israel, Hezbollah being a principle example.
Today anti-Western terrorism is the near-exclusive province of al Qaeda, founded by Osama bin Laden and headed by him.[20] By the time of al Qaeda's advent, Islamism "defined Islam as the exact antithesis of the West, under the guise of reclaiming the true and real Islam. Whatever the West was perceived to be, Islam was understood to be the exact opposite." [21] Bin Laden broke new ground in two ways: first in the boldness and scope of his attacks and second in that he was uninterested in traditional internal Muslim bickering. Any Muslim was welcome who wished to fight America, the West, or the apostate rulers of Muslim countries.
Osama bin Laden's strategic objectives
Converted to Islamism by fighting in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden became the most die-hard jihadi of all. Unfortunately, he had hundreds of millions of dollars of family wealth to back him up. Bin Laden used a great deal of it before his access to it was cut off.
The new mission in life that bin Laden adopted can be stated simply: pure Islamic rule and life for Islamic lands, followed by re-establishing a unified, Muslim caliphate reflecting the old Muslim empire at its peak. After that, the rest of the world is to be converted to Islam by peaceful means if possible, by war if necessary.
The first imperative: eject America. Bin Laden, being a Saudi, turned attention first to his home country even though he no longer lived in it. No matter where pure Islamism might be established, Islamism as a renewal movement would fail if never established in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was the native land of Mohammed; bin Laden frequently referred to it as "the land of the Two Holy Mosques" (one being Mecca itself, the holiest site in all Islam, the other being in Medina).
 The Soviets had hardly withdrawn in defeat from Afghanistan than there was an enormous influx of American and other Western military forces into Saudi Arabia after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. After the Gulf War, a substantial American military presence remained in Saudi Arabia. Their presence was objectionable to bin Laden for two reasons. First, the Westerners defiled the holy land of Mohammed because they were non-Muslim infidels. Second, their presence proved the impotence, and hence the religious apostasy, of the ruling House of Saud. A pure Islamic nation would have no need of infidel troops to defend itself. As far as he was concerned, the Americans were invaders of Saudi Arabia; he told The Independent of Britain in 1996 that "our country has become an American colony." Bin Laden became convinced that America was in conspiracy with "Zionists" to destroy Islam.
Bin Laden was also convinced that Mohammed's native land must be trod only by Muslims, never by non-Muslims. True Islam in Saudi Arabia could not be achieved with the kufr (unbeliever) army stationed there; hence the American presence must be expelled and not just America’s military presence. All non-Muslim Americans must leave.
Bin Laden's first grievance, though, was against the ruling House of Saud, whom bin Laden (and many clerics in Saudi Arabia, for that matter) considered apostate to Islam. Not only had it invited the American army into the kingdom - the most serious charge Osama held against the royals - bin Laden has been emphatic that the Saudi regime is corrupt and oppressive of the Saudi people, although, of course, he blamed the United States for all this. In his 1996 fatwa(religious judgment), "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," bin Laden said of the House of Saud:
The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet (Allah's blessing and salutations on him) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places - the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka'ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims - by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies. . . .
 [T]he competition between influential [Saudi] princes for personal gains and interest had destroyed the country. Through its course of actions the regime has torn off its legitimacy:
 (1) Suspension of the Islamic Shari'ah law and exchanging it with man made civil law. . . .
 (2) The inability of the regime to protect the country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah [Muslim people] - the American crusader forces- to occupy the land for the longest of years.
There followed a long list of grievances against the Saudi regime, particularly emphasizing its un-Islamic rule, the wealth-corruption of its princes and accusations of being a puppet of the USA.
Yet Osama seems indifferent whether the Saudi royals convert to pure Islam, as bin Laden defines it, or are destroyed. In a November 1996 interview with "Nida'ul Islam," bin Laden said, regarding Saudi Arabia,
There are several choices for the regime [of which] the most important of these is to bring back Islamic law, and to practice real Shura [consultative government].
The regime may resort to this choice after finding itself in the position of a morsel of food for the Americans to take, after the enmity has been stirred with their people. These people today feel that the Americans have exceeded their limits both politically and economically, the regime now knows that the public are aware that their sovereignty is shared. This was particularly evident in the recent period through the American press statements which give justification to the American occupation which only exists to rob the wealth of the people to the benefit of the Americans. This option is dependent on the agreement of the people who hold the solution and have the ability to effect change, at the forefront of these would be the honest scholars.
As for the other option, this is a very difficult and dangerous one for the regime, and this involves an escalation in the confrontation between the Muslim people and the American occupiers and to confront the economic hemorrhage. Its most important goal would be to change the current regime, with the permission of Allah.
Abd-al-Bari 'Atwan, editor in chief of the London-based Al-Quds al-'Arabi newspaper, said after another interview with bin Ladin, conducted by Jamal Isma'il in Afghanistan and broadcast on Middle East television,
I felt that the man had his own vision and special strategy. This strategy is based on his concept of the region. The first point in this strategy is that the US Administration or the US forces, which he considers occupation forces in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, are a prelude to a comprehensive Israeli-Jewish hegemony over the region with the aim of looting its wealth and humiliating its Muslim people. One senses this as the essence of his creed and strategy.
Therefore, he believes that expelling these US forces from the Arab world is a top priority. He believes that the regimes should be reformed or, more correctly, changed. The regimes immune to reform should be changed, the sharia should be applied properly, and a just Islamic system should be set up in the Islamic and Arab states, particularly the Gulf states. This is a summary of his strategy. Currently, he does not want to fight the regimes. That is what he told me. He wants to fight the Americans, who are protecting these regimes.
So while bin Laden does not specifically seek to destroy the House of Saud, he thinks it will be necessary if the House does not reform. If the royals are brought down violently, bin Laden thinks it will be by popular uprising, a revolution resulting from the long-suffering Saudi people deciding to suffer no more. His 1996 fatwa makes clear that he expects this general uprising to do two things in sequence: expel the Americans from Saudi Arabia, then force reform of the Saudi regime or its replacement. The result will be the institution of a true Islamic society - as bin Laden understands such a society to be.
Because bin Laden thinks that US forces entered Saudi Arabia not as allies but as conquerors, he is convinced that America will not vacate Saudi Arabia on its own. It must be expelled violently. This task, he says in the fatwa, is the primary duty of every true Muslim. [22]
The greatest threat to Islamism
Yussuf al-Ayyeri, one of Osama bin Laden's closest associates since the early 1990s, was killed by Saudi security forces in Riyadh in June 2003. He wrote a book published by al Qaeda entitled, The Future of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula shortly before his death. In it al-Ayyeri explained succinctly America's greatest threat to Islamism: "It is not the American war machine that should be of the utmost concern to Muslims. What threatens the future of Islam, in fact its very survival, is democracy."
Iran-born author Amir Taheri summarized the book thus for the New York Post:
Al-Ayyeri then shows how various forms of unbelief attacked the world of Islam in the past century or so, to be defeated in one way or another.
The first form of unbelief to attack was "modernism" (hidatha), which led to the caliphate's destruction and the emergence in the lands of Islam of states based on ethnic identities and territorial dimensions rather than religious faith.
What Al-Ayyeri sees now is a "clean battlefield" in which Islam faces a new form of unbelief. This, he labels "secularist democracy." This threat is "far more dangerous to Islam" than all its predecessors combined. The reasons, he explains in a whole chapter, must be sought in democracy's "seductive capacities."
This form of "unbelief" persuades the people that they are in charge of their destiny and that, using their collective reasoning, they can shape policies and pass laws as they see fit. [23]
Modernity is precisely what bin Laden and his allies are fighting against, for modernity carries within it the idea that human societies should be able to shape their culture as they please. But such is anathema to radical Islamism, which wants to make strict sharia, Islamic law, the sole rule of society.
The problem of science
Equally threatening to Islamism as the Western democratic tradition is the Western idea that truth about the very nature of reality and humankind’s place in the cosmos can come from human investigation – science –  rather than divine revelation. Experimental science is a European invention, although the Muslims came close to inventing it near the end of their golden age. In fact, the Turks built a great observatory near Istanbul in 1577 that was the equal of any in Europe. But the sultan ordered it razed to the ground on the insistence of the Chief Mufti. That event ended decisively near-Eastern Muslim science down to the present day. Science education in Arab lands today is limited in scope and is more engineering than research science.
Modern science has had a much more difficult time being accepted in Muslim lands than elsewhere in the world. In an article, “The Religion of Modern Science: Roots of modern God-free thinking,” published in the western-based Islamic Journal, Muslim author Harun Yahya wrote of Western scientific absolutists who “regard modern science as absolute and true religion, and want to impose this view to all humankind. . . . However, the question is not that whether Islam is in line with science or not, but whether science is in line with Islam. What needs to be approved is science, not Islam.” [24]
There are many points of contention and conflict between Arab Islam and the West, but the chief religious contention between Islamists and the West is not really between Islam and Christianity but between Islam and Western scientific-materialism.
Because of the supremacy of the sciences in western thought, Western culture has become caught in a cycle of ever-increasing changes. Western societies contend with an exponentially increasing pace of cultural changes. The pace and kinds of changes that we adapt to (with greater or lesser difficulty, to be sure) are exactly the changes that Islamists correctly believe would destroy basic structures of their society which they believe are the divinely-commanded.
In their view, certain social structures (chiefly the status and role of women) are absolutely essential, required by Allah's command as revealed in the Quran. Without those structures, a society is wholly corrupted. We see them as hopeless religious fanatics; they see us as godless and degenerate.
The tension between Islam's historic traditions and modern pressures of scientific modernity is found throughout the Muslim world. Many Arab intellectuals know that their countries have fallen behind most of the rest of the world. They want to gain the benefits of technological society, but without the cultural baggage that comes with it. They want to modernize their societies but not westernize them. Their vision of modernization is mostly technological, such as communications, medical science, education, transportation, and consumer goods.
These twin desires – keep the West out but bring modernity’s trappings in – are in perpetual tension. Not even the strictest mullahs are willing to give up their cell phones and hearing aids in their dream of a throwback Muslim society. As for the so-called Arab street, enormous numbers of them want to live in the West, and many millions of them have emigrated from Arab lands to do so. Before America invaded Iraq, seventy-five percent of the world’s refugees were from Muslim countries.
But the Arabs’ state their revulsion for the West more strongly than they really mean. So, wrote Victor Davis Hanson, [25]
The best way to get America and the West out of millions of Islamic lives is not to burn effigies of George Bush in the Arab Street, but would be for Arab governments to prohibit immigration to the West, to stop importing Western material goods, and to bar decadent Westerners from entering Arab countries.
Any takers? The bitter truth is that the Middle East wants the West far more than the West the Middle East.
Whether political or religious fervor primarily motivate anti-Western terrorism is unclear, and does not really matter. The bifurcation of politics and religion is a Western notion, not a Muslim one. In any event, their aim is to cleanse the Arab lands of Westernism and institute their own version of pure Islamic society. The paradigms of success are Iran and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan; even the very conservative Saudis are too Western for them.
The Old is New Again
The war that radical, violent Islamists are waging against the West springs from the fact that Islamism and Westernism are fundamentally incompatible. But both are too deeply embedded in both sides' culture, social systems, politics and religion to be very easily altered. Compared to this centuries-old struggle, the Cold War was a brief respite. Rather than the new millennium inaugurating a golden age of human progress and well-being, what was old is new again. History has returned.
Update, December 2025: If, as Victor Davis Hanson, wrote, the Islamists want "to get America and the West out of millions of Islamic lives," then today their goal has been to de-westernize the West and make it Islamic. This is well underway in Europe, where this Christmas season Muslims in Germany and Belgium have stampeded through cities' outdoor Christmas markets and have caused many to be canceled or barricaded. This happened in Brussels this week:


Footnotes:
1. There was anti-Jewish violence in Palestine dating all the way back to the 1920s, but the organization of essentially terroristic, anti-Israel factions among the Palestinians really dates from the establishment of Israel as an political entity. In 1952, for example, "there were about 3,000 incidents of cross-border violence" and from 1951-1955 almost 1,000 Israelis died in such attacks, according to the Israeli government.

2. Islamist terrorist groups operate there now whose direct patrons are Syria and Islamic Iran. There are excellent reasons to believe that Islamist terrorist groups became dominant before 2000; their influence and proven murderousness may have been a key reason Yasir Arafat turned down breathtaking concessions offered by Israel during the Wye River negotiations sponsored by the Clinton administration. By 2004 Arafat's own officers openly acknowledged the Islamist groups' power. In 2002 an officer of Fatah, founded by Arafat in the 1950s, openly told the Jerusalem Post, "We can't ignore the role of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the resistance against Israel. On the other hand, we can't turn a blind eye to the broad popular support that they enjoy among the Palestinians" (Apr. 19, 2004).

3. The difference between the Right and Left is that the Right said the attacks were divine judgment against America because of individual Americans' increasingly immoral character, while the Left said the attacks were the justified and inevitable response by the oppressed to America's imperialistic economic and foreign policies.

4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Mlecková, “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism,” http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i39/39b01001.htm

5. Lee Harris, “The Intellectual Origins Of America-Bashing,” Policy Review, Dec. 2002.

6. "Harvard Gazette," Nov. 4, 2004.

7. Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," October 2004.

10. Thomas F. Madden, “The Real History of the Crusades.” Crisis, April 1, 2002.

11. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong. Perennial Press, 2002

12. During 1991's Gulf War, I was a career Army officer, assigned to the US Army’s main operations center below the Pentagon. There I read a State Department message summarizing what a very senior Egyptian government official had said to an American diplomat. One thing stuck in my mind. “Egypt is the only true Arab nation state,” said the official. “The rest are all tribes with flags.” This particular official insisted that American ideas about Arab unity were nonsense.

13. “Wrestling With Islam,” http://www.davidwarrenonline.com/Miscell/index02.shtml

14. “When Pakistan was created, its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, famously declared, ‘You are free, free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state.’” (Zahir Janmohamed, Washington Post, June 25, 2003; Page A23

15. However, the modern West treated Middle Eastern lands as backward places to be conquered or enlightened (The French and British from 1798-1948) and/or as holding resources to be gained through commercial exploitation (America, Britain and France from the 1930s until now). In fact, Arab “countries” are mostly a Western imposition, except for Egypt, and much of the troubles there arose from the fact that the national boundaries of Arab countries were drawn by European rulers.
    For much of the Cold War America used Arab nations, along with Turkey and Iran, as a bulwark against potential Soviet expansionism toward the oil fields of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It was not an unreasonable fear, but it slewed our relationship with the region in utilitarian ways, which many Arabs saw as another form of colonialism.
    Today, however, the great majority of Iranians today are too young to remember pre-Islamism days and are rejecting the harsh, oppressive rule of the ayatollahs. The ayatollahs have not made the people’s life better than under the shah; in many ways it is worse, especially in the regulation of personal minutiae. Of the Iranians, “the majority want a sweeping transformation. They do not want to be told what to think, what to wear, what to read, what to watch and how to behave, and they are frustrated at the glacial pace of change.” (New York Times, June 16, 2003). In many ways, this statement defines the frustration felt by masses of Arabs with their own governments.

16. Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind. Hatherleigh Press, 2002.

17. Thomas L. Friedman, “Arabs Lift Their Voices.” New York Times, April 7, 2005

18. Gilles Kepel, “The Trail of Political Islam.” http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-5-57-421.jsp

19. Khaled Abou El Fadl ,"Islam and the Theology of Power." Islam for Today, http://www.islamfortoday.com/elfadl01.htm

20. Al Qaeda, however, is not a unitary organization with a rigid, vertically-organized chain of command. It is a conglomerate of sometimes disparate groups with like aims, willing to use like means, enjoying the fruits of bin Laden’s core staff’s work, and oriented on common enemies, mainly Saudi Arabia’s ruling royals and America.

21. El Fadl, op. cit.

22. The United States removed most of its armed forces from Saudi Arabia after 2003's invasion of Iraq. But some American military remain there, as well as thousands of American civilians who live there. So American infidels still corrupt the soil of the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.

23. Amir Teheri, “Al Qaeda’s Agenda for Iraq.” New York Post, Sept. 4, 2003

25. V. D. Hanson, “Winning After All.” National Review, June 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson062003.asp

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